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NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2019

TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA  
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP  
MEETING, NOVEMBER 16, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0979 (SFO-GVA-VI-042)  
1B. GENEVA 1070 (SFO-GVA-VII-017)  
1C. GENEVA 0803 (SFO-GVA-V-019)  
1D. STATE 115348

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-025.

12. (U) Meeting Date: November 16, 2009  
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.  
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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13. (S) A meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) was held on November 16, 2009. Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin discussed the new Russian-proposed combined inspection of both deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA) and non-deployed SOA at operational bases, Section VI. The key to the Russian acceptance of a combined inspection concept was the reduction of inspection allocations. The Russian proposal was consistent with previous Russian positions providing for a smaller sampling of inspectable items than in U.S. proposals with no special procedures for mobile systems, no inspection of heavy bomber (HB) nuclear armament weapon storage areas (WSA), and provisions for periodic inspection of SSGBs and converted B-1 HBS.

**¶4. (U) Subject Summary:** Russian Section VI: Not Really "Combined"; Inspection Allocations Key to Russia Accepting Combined Concept; Comparing U.S. and Russian Proposals on Section VI; Russia Accepts U.S. Concept of How to Treat Missiles With Zero Warheads; Two Missiles Provide No Extra Confidence on Upload; Details on Mobiles: No Special Treatment; Details on Heavy Bombers: Inspect Few and Stay Out of WSA; Details on Submarines: SSGNs Have No SLBM Launchers; and, All The Rest.

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RUSSIAN SECTION VI:  
NOT REALLY "COMBINED"  
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**¶5. (S)** Warner opened the meeting with an acknowledgement of receiving a new proposal from Russia over the weekend for a combined inspection of both deployed SOA and non-deployed SOA at operational bases, Section VI. Warner noted, however, that the Russian document seemed to focus only on deployed systems and their warheads, and did not include provisions for briefing or inspecting non-deployed missiles in maintenance facilities or at submarine base storage areas.

**¶6. (S)** Ilin completely agreed with Warner that the Russian proposal only concerned deployed SOA at operational bases. Ilin also said that the U.S. proposal for combined inspection (REF A) also dealt with only deployed SOA. (Begin comment: This underscored the continued Russian confusion with the U.S. proposal for a combined inspection that includes both deployed SOA and non-deployed SOA at operational bases. End comment.)

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INSPECTION ALLOCATIONS  
KEY TO RUSSIA ACCEPTING  
COMBINED CONCEPT  
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**¶7. (S)** Ilin continued that Russia could only consider a true combined inspection of deployed and non-deployed SOA if the number of inspection allocations was reduced to eight. Ilin said that if the number of inspection allocations was similar to START, then there would be no sense in combining the inspections. Warner said that neither the 28 total yearly inspections under START, nor the 16 yearly inspections proposed by Russia (8 Type 1 and 8 Type 2) for START Follow-on was the correct number. Warner and Ilin later agreed that inspection allocations would be the topic of a later one-on-one meeting.

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COMPARING U.S. AND RUSSIAN  
PROPOSALS ON SECTION VI  
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**¶8. (S)** Warner and Ilin discussed the main differences between the Russian and U.S. proposals for Section VI. While there was a difference in the yearly allocation, both Parties agreed that there should only be one such inspection at any one time or no more than one inspection simultaneously at the same base.

**¶9. (S)** Warner further noted that the document seemed similar in content to the briefing that Colonel Petrov gave on November 12 (REF B). For paragraph 6, which listed pre-inspection briefing requirements, Ilin said there were no real differences from Petrov's briefing. Warner noted that there were no provisions to brief data on non-deployed missiles.

**¶10. (S)** Ilin also confirmed that there were some similarities between the original and new Russian proposal, but there were also some differences; the inspection provisions between different types of SOA were now more symmetrical than in the initial Russian proposal. Ilin

explained that the new Russian document included elements from the U.S. proposal, such as the data that was required for the pre-inspection briefing.

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RUSSIA ACCEPTS U.S. CONCEPT  
OF HOW TO TREAT MISSILES  
WITH ZERO WARHEADS  
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¶11. (S) The sides discussed paragraph 7 of the new Russian Section VI. Ilin clarified several points that reflected a change in position from their original proposal (REF C). One deployed launcher and one non-deployed launcher would be inspected. However, the new Russian proposal now reflected the U.S.-proposed concept that a missile with zero warheads or no front section in a deployed launcher would be considered to be a deployed missile and would be subject to

nuclear warhead inspection (NWI) procedures, albeit simpler. A non-deployed launcher would be completely empty; the inspection team would have the right to inspect one such non-deployed launcher. For mobile systems, the Russian document contained procedures for inspecting all empty "shelters" of a mobile launcher in a single basing area. (Begin comment: U.S. term is "fixed structure." End comment.)

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TWO MISSILES PROVIDE NO  
EXTRA CONFIDENCE ON UPLOAD  
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¶12. (S) Warner contrasted this with the U.S. proposal to select two launchers, which could both contain a missile, or if one launcher was empty, would also count against the allocation. Warner stated that the U.S. side thought the potential to inspect two deployed missiles would appeal to the Russians because of its concerns about U.S. upload potential. Ilin replied that one occupied launcher was enough. The relationship between the United States and Russia is much better than it was when START was drafted. There was no need to track every movement. The right to inspect was important and sufficient to provide a strong deterrent against cheating. Inspecting two missiles did not provide extra confidence. Ilin also said that inspecting a single deployed missile also was less costly and created less disruption to the inspected base.

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DETAILS ON MOBILES:  
NO SPECIAL TREATMENT  
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¶13. (S) The Parties discussed provisions in the new Russian proposal for mobile ICBMs. Warner asked what the key components of such an inspection would be. Ilin said that the inspection team would select a deployed mobile ICBM launcher from any basing area and all empty "shelters" for mobile ICBM launchers from any one basing area. The inspection team would confirm that such "shelters" were empty. The selected deployed ICBM launcher would return to the maintenance facility where the front section would be separated, the warheads covered (Begin comment: Most likely Ilin was speaking in general terms and did not caveat that currently SS-25 road-mobile front sections are not separated from the missile for inspections. End comment.), and the numbers of warheads confirmed.

¶14. (S) Warner noted that the U.S. proposal contained a "return" provision for mobile ICBM launchers, and asked what type of data on absent mobile launchers would be provided. Ilin said that the numbers of deployed mobile launchers in basing areas and away from basing areas would be provided, and that the number of non-deployed launchers at the maintenance facility would be briefed. Warner asked whether the non-deployed launchers at the maintenance facility would

be inspectable. Ilin said no, and explained how just like a submarine in dry dock, mobile launchers in the maintenance facility should not be inspectable.

¶15. (S) Warner asked whether provisions to perform a data

update inspection of one restricted area would be carried over from START in the new Russian proposal. Ilin said no. Data on all assigned mobile systems would be briefed, but only one deployed launcher would be inspected.

¶16. (S) Warner engaged Ilin about the need to either inspect inside fixed structures or open the roofs of the fixed structures for cooperative measures. Ilin did not agree with Warner's analogy that because silo ICBM and SLBM launchers were in the open and could be seen by national technical means (NTM) or inspectors that it would make sense to allow the inspection of road-mobile launchers in their fixed structures, nor did he agree with the analogy that fixed structures were like heavy bomber hangars and should be subject to cooperative measures.

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DETAILS ON HEAVY  
BOMBERS: INSPECT FEW  
AND STAY OUT OF WSA  
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¶17. (S) The sides then discussed heavy bomber provisions contained in paragraph 7.b of the new Russian document, which Warner noted were different than in the original Russian proposal. Ilin agreed.

¶18. (S) Warner noted that it was not necessary to distinguish between heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs (LRNA) and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA; heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments would suffice. Ilin agreed that this made sense and the Russian Delegation would study this suggestion.

¶19. (S) Ilin proposed that, in order to simplify procedures for inspecting heavy bombers, a Party would only need to inspect a sampling of heavy bombers. Ilin noted that this was consistent with the Russian methodology used for ICBM and SLBM bases. The new Russian proposal included a provision to inspect up to three each of deployed, non-deployed, and non-nuclear heavy bombers that were captured by pre-inspection restrictions. He agreed with Warner that this also differed from START in that heavy bombers would not need to be of the same type based at the designated base. Warner asked for clarification about how Russia would treat non-deployed heavy bombers visiting an operational heavy bomber base. Petrov noted that non-deployed heavy bombers attributed to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base could visit other operational heavy bomber bases. Warner said, given the state of the U.S. bombers at Davis-Monthan, it is highly doubtful that any of them will be visiting U.S. operational heavy bomber bases. (Begin comment: Warner was referring to B-52s and B-1s not undergoing conversion. End Comment.)

¶20. (S) Regarding the U.S.-proposed inspection of heavy bomber nuclear armaments weapon storage areas (NAWSA), the Russian position did not change its position; NAWSAs will not be inspected. Only the warheads loaded on heavy bombers will be briefed; no other information about the nuclear armaments in the NAWSA would be briefed. The Russian proposal to attribute a heavy bomber with one warhead would be reported as an aggregate only and not broken down by base. Warner underscored the U.S. intent to require reporting of the

actual number of nuclear armaments in heavy bomber NAWSAs, and that the United States would not accept Russia reporting an arbitrary "X" number of nuclear armaments for each heavy bomber base.

DETAILS ON SUBMARINES:SSGNS  
HAVE NO SLBM LAUNCHERS

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¶21. (S) The sides discussed provisions for submarine bases contained in the new Russian Section VI, paragraph 7. Warner noted Russia included provisions to inspect SSGN cruise missile launchers, and that such provisions were not consistent with the package of solutions proposed by National Security Advisor Jones in Moscow (REF D), which proposed a one-time exhibition. Warner stated that the Russian proposal for periodic checks should not be included in this section. The C-4 SLBM, also known as the Trident I, would not be an existing type, so there was no reason to include it as an item of inspection. Ilin said Russia has a different logic, and that they would treat the SSGN launcher as an empty SLBM launcher and it should be subject to periodic inspection. Warner noted that the SSGN launcher cannot hold or launch an SLBM, and that any viewing of such a launcher would have to be either a type of exhibition or fall under a Type 2 allocation, but could not be included as an element within a Type 1 inspection.

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ALL THE REST

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¶22. (S) The sides discussed the transportation timelines in the new Russian proposal; Ilin noted Russia used about 95 percent of the U.S.-proposed wording, but adjusted the times themselves to better reflect inspection realities.

¶23. (S) Ilin noted that all detailed inspection procedures would be in an annex to be determined later. Ilin said it would be much more difficult to develop procedures for Russian systems because Russia had many more types than the United States. Warner said it was "time to get to work" and the Russian side should study the U.S.-proposed Annex 6.

¶24. (S) Warner briefly reviewed the Type 2 inspection of non-deployed SOA, and how the concept for such inspections would change if the Parties returned to separate, non-combined inspections with Type 1 inspections focused on deployed SOA and Type 2 inspections on non-deployed SOA. Warner emphasized that Russia must choose quickly on which type of inspection regime to pursue; there were two choices. The first option would be to have separate inspections of deployed SOA and of non-deployed SOA. The second option would be to have combined inspections of both deployed and non-deployed SOA at operational bases, and inspections of non-deployed SOA at other facilities. Ilin concluded that the number of inspection allocations needed to be determined first.

¶25. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

¶26. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner  
Mr. Buttrick  
Mr. DeNinno  
LCDR Feliciano  
Maj Johnson  
LTC Leyde  
Mr. Rust  
Ms. Pura  
Mr. Sims  
Mr. Smith  
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin  
Mr. Ivanov

Mr. Lobach  
Col Petrov  
Mr. Poznihir  
Mr. Vorontsov  
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

¶27. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
GRIFFITHS